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This paper provides an economic analysis of the post-war regulation of European tenancy markets. 
Two representative types of market regulation are analyzed: the introduction of compulsory duration 
clauses in tenancy contracts (as a means of protecting the tenant against eviction); and rent control 
policies. First, the study describes and analyzes the recent history of such regulations in Spain, Italy, 
Finland and the UK, in order to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of European 
institutions in recent decades. Their effects are then explored by adapting a theoretical model of 
tenancy markets. The results show that both rent control and compulsory duration clauses potentially 
entail negative effects for European tenancy markets as they may drive some participants out of the 
market. These effects are consistent with the trends observed during the latter half of the 20th century 
in several European countries. 
JEL Classification: R31, K12, N4. 
Keywords: Rent control, Tenancy contracts, Compulsory terms 
1.  Introduction 
In several European countries, the weight of the tenancy market relative to the 
total stock of principal residences has diminished throughout the 20
th century. Figure 1 
shows, using information held in public databases of the European central banks, recent 
evidence for 12 European countries. 
Several explanations could be provided to understand that general trend, ranging 
from the finance literature, which considers housing as an investment good, to the more 
general housing economics literature that regards housing as a consumption good (see 
Henderson and Ionnides, 1983 and Rosen et al. 1984 for some early references). For 
instance, in recent decades improvements in access to credit and significant 
development of the financial markets (Iacoviello and Minetti, 2003, Kumbhakar and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2004, Blanco and Restoy, 2007) have occurred, which may have favored 
the property market. Some fiscal regimes have also privileged buying over renting of 
residences (see López-García, 1996, García-Vaquero and Martínez, 2005, for the case of 
Spain).  
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(2007), and to Stefano Battilossi, Claire McHugh and two anonymous referees for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
2 Banco de España-Eurosystem & OECD. E-mail: juansmora@hotmail.com. The views expressed in 
this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed to the Banco de España, the 
Eurosystem or the OECD.  
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Nevertheless, it is only some specialized literature which takes into account the 
effects of regulations and institutions of the tenancy market (other than fiscal policies), 
such as rent control clauses or periods of protection for tenants. A weak tenancy market 
and a diminishing rate of tenancy seem to be related, for instance, to the introduction of 
rent control policies. In this respect, the microeconomic intuition that relates a rent 
ceiling with a diminishing quantity and quality of residences in the tenancy market has 
been supported by several theoretical explorations (Basu and Emerson, 2000, Raess and 
Ungern-Sternberg, 2002, Basu and Emerson 2003) or empirical analyses (Johnson, 1951, 
Alston et al., 1992, Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003, Sims 2007 among others). 
However, most of the research on rent control has  merely examined the type of 
market intervention enforced in local markets of the United States (for a summary, see 
Turner and Malpezzi, 2003). In contrast, less analysis has been made of the specific 
effects of European-style tenancy restrictions. Exceptions to that are Peña and Ruiz-
Castillo (1984) for Spain, by Munch and Svarer (2002) for Denmark and by Lyytikäinen 
(2006) in respect of Finland.  
Moreover, the regulations in force in various European countries impose not only 
rent control clauses but also clauses of protection term (duration clauses) against 
eviction. Both kinds of rules may have had an effect on the diminishing share of tenancy 
in very different economies. At the same time partially liberalizing laws, such as those 
adopted in the UK (England and Wales) and Finland, may have had the opposite 
effects. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the regulations specifically directed to the 
tenancy markets in Europe and to provide a theoretical exploration of their economic 
implications. The structure of this paper proceeds as follows: firstly, the paper identifies 
the most common market regulations affecting European tenancy contracts by 
analyzing the various national laws (section 2). Those regulations are then introduced in Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
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a model of tenancy markets to explore their effects theoretically (section 3). Finally, the 
paper draws some conclusions based on the analysis carried out (section 4). 
2.  The regulation of housing tenancy markets in Europe 
At the beginning of the 20
th century, “contractual freedom” inspired the contents 
of tenancy contracts in several European countries, following the principle of the 
“autonomy” of private parties.
3  However, as the century progressed, “contractual 
freedom” was gradually restricted by the introduction of some tenancy regulations (such 
as rent ceilings, compulsory terms or control over the increase of the rent) which had 
the objective of improving the situation of tenants in the context of a shortage of rental 
housing stock  following the First and Second World Wars (or the Civil War in the case 
of Spain). 
If the analysis is limited to rent control policies, one can follow the classification 
made by Arnott (1998) of their different types into “two generations”. A “first 
generation” rent control would include rent freezes and exceptional upward 
adjustments. A “second generation” rent control would include automatic percentage 
rent increases linked to the rate of inflation (or similar indices). While tenancy markets 
in the United States were gradually deregulated, with very few cities maintaining the 
controls after 1950, in Europe the first generation rent controls survived longer due to 
the long-lasting effects of the two World Wars. Arnott (1998) identifies the surge of the 
second generation controls with the inflationary crisis of 1973. 
However, rent control is only one of the market regulations introduced in the 
European tenancy markets. In fact, “compulsory terms” are a mean of temporarily 
protecting the tenant against eviction. It is also possible to classify those regulations by 
their severity: the protection could be permanent, therefore rendering the duration of 
the contract subject to the will of the tenant, or temporary.  
In this section, a detailed analysis is provided for Spain, as a benchmark, Italy, UK 
and Finland (the last three providing examples of countries that introduced relevant 
reforms in recent decades) and an overview of the most recent regulations for a 
multiplicity of European countries (see Table 1). 
                                                 
3 This was the case, for instance, in Article 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code (1889) and Article 1322 of 
the Italian Civil Code (1942). Those articles followed the French tradition (Article 1134 of the French 
Civil Code, 1804).  
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Code) (1811) and 
MRG (1981) as a 
specific  Statute 
Minimum duration of 3 
years 
The rent and the rent increase are 
thoroughly regulated. The legislation 
sets the maximum rent at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract. An 
increase in the rent is possible but it has 















Minimum duration of 3 
years 
An index-clause can be introduced to 
increase the rent (although increasing it 
above the applicable “cost of living” 
indices can be declared void by the 
courts). A market rent review can take 
place every three years (without the risk 
















Act 348 of 
14/05/2001) 
No minimum duration 
is established by the 
legislation,  although 
notice from the 
landlord to terminate 
the contract is subject 
to severe conditions. 
The landlord may give 
notice if he intends to 
use the apartment for 
himself. 
Increase is allowed if justified (the value 
of the property must be significantly 
higher than the rent paid in proportion 
to that). An increase via an “index-
clause” is generally not allowed. In 
small multi-storey properties, the rent is 
determined by the usual rent paid for 
properties of equal location, size, type, 



















  Rent Act 1977. 
Housing Acts 
1980, 1988, 1996 
and the common 
law. 
Several regimes are in 
force. From 1997 the 
“assured shorthold 
tenancy” is the default 
form of tenancy (the 
parties can contract for 
any duration they wish 
but the tenant has the 
right to remain in the 
property for an initial 6 
months in any case) 
There is no general public control of 
increases in rents although a specific 
rent increase may be submitted to 
control (courts, assessment committee). 
“Rent regulation” properly-speaking 
disappeared after the Housing Act of 
1988. 
Tenancies created before 
15 January 1989 are 
governed by the Rent Act 
1977. After that date (and 
before 28 February 1997), 
a tenancy can be an 














No restriction. Under 
previous statutes the 
grounds for eviction 
were strict. However a 
landlord’s need to use 
the apartment for 
himself was a valid 
ground to evict the 
tenant. 
No restriction. Usually the rent increase 
is linked to the consumer price index. 
More general rent 
regulation existed before 
Statute 482/1995, such as 









Mermaz act, Law 
89-462 (1989) 
Minimum duration of 3 
years (if the landlord is 
a natural person) 
If the tenancy contract provides for the 
possibility of increasing the rent, the 
increase cannot exceed the construction 
cost index (determined by the public 
authorities). In the case of an extension 
of the lease, the new rent must refer to 
the average rent of the neighborhood. 
Previous Acts introduced 
similar restrictions: Law 
82-526 (Quillot Act), Law 
86-1290 (Quilès-
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Civil Code (BGB).  
Amendments of 
2001 and 2002 
The landlord has to 
give a reason listed in 
the BGB in order to 
terminate the contract. 
If the rent exceeds by 20% the rent 
charged in comparable premises, the 
landlord can be fined. An increase in 
the rent can only take place after one 
year of tenancy. The increase can be 
agreed freely or linked to a cost-of-
living index. If the increase is not 
agreed in the contract, the landlord can 
still ask for it but it cannot exceed the 
customary in the area where the 
premises are located (and in any case it 

















Tenant can ask for an 
extension of the lease 
(up to 4 years) after 6 
months of tenancy. 
No restrictions under the regime 









by Law 431/1998 
Minimum duration of 4 
years 
Before 1998, the rent and any rent 
increase were regulated. Since 1998, 
there is no regulation of this respect 
(rent increases can be freely determined 











Civil Code (1966). 
Decree-Law 321-
B/1990. 
Minimum duration of 5 
years 
The parties can choose between a “free 
rent regime” and a “conditioned rent 
regime”. Free regime: the rent and its 
increase are freely agreed between the 
parties. Although in the case of a 
residential tenancy (in contracts of up 
to 8 years’ duration) the increase is 
regulated (increase related to the 
consumer price index). Conditioned 
regime: the rent is set by the applicable 
law  (which takes into account the 
average rents of similar premises). The 
conditioned regime may be mandatory 
under certain circumstances 
A new Law (6/2006) has 











Minimum duration of 5 
years (Law 29/1994). 
The rent increase is linked to the 
consumer price index 
Under Royal Decree-Law 
2/1985 (between 1985 
and 1995) there was no 
compulsory extension of 
the contracts. Law 
19/2009 gave the owner 
more legal grounds to 











introduced in the 
Land Code (1970) 
No minimum duration 
established by the Act. 
However, the Act 
establishes a strict 
regime for the landlord. 
For instance, the fact 
that the landlord needs 
the apartment for his 
own use is not a 
sufficient ground to 
terminate the contract 
Prices are normally determined by the 
collective bargaining of associations. 
The courts do engage in some rent 
control 
 
Source: National laws, Government databases of laws and the EUI Tenancy Law Project.  




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
52 
2.1 Spain 
The tenancy market was not deeply regulated in Spain prior to 1931. Only some 
partial decrees limiting the duration of the tenancy contracts  and rent therein were 
passed for specific situations and in particular cities during the 1920’s.
4 The Spanish 
Civil Code (1889) was mainly liberal: Article 1255 thereof stated that private parties were 
free to agree any terms and conditions in a contract as long as they were not contrary to 
“Law, morality and public order”. 
In 1931
5 the limitations to contractual freedom introduced in the previous decade 
became permanent. However, the first complete piece of regulation of tenancy markets 
did not occur until 1946, with the “Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos” (Urban Tenancy Act).
6 
Since then, a Law of this kind has always remained in force in Spain (the 
aforementioned law of 1946 being the first, and later, the Laws of 1964, 1985 and 1994). 
The restrictions introduced by the 1946 Law were a reaction to the profound changes 
undergone in Spanish society before the Civil War, such as the rural exodus, and, after 
1936, the shortage of housing caused by the Civil War. In any case, more general 
populist reasons also influenced these early initiatives which were a mean of winning 
support for the newly established political regimes (firstly, the Second Spanish Republic, 
and after 1939, Franco's dictatorship). 
The Law of 1946 rendered the principles of the Civil Code almost inapplicable 
(Rodríguez-Aguilera and Peré, 1965), introducing, among other restrictions, a 
“compulsory duration clause” and a “regulation of rents”. At this stage, the 
interventions were severe. The tenant’s protection against eviction was unlimited. Even 
close relatives of the tenant were able to succeed him as tenants in the same dwelling 
and benefiting from the same conditions. With respect to rents, the Law established 
fixed one-time increments in the rent paid for apartments leased before 1939 and 
freezed the rents in respect of all new contracts. 
In 1964 the Government adopted a new Law through a new Decree
7 which 
compiled several partial amendments to the old legislation (including the Law of 22 
December 1955 among others). The new Law, which remained in force until 1985, 
maintained the rules governing the duration of the contract (indefinite extension 
thereof). However, a timid change in the rules governing the rents was introduced. The 
Law allowed an increase of the rents in contracts signed after 1956 after the fifth year of 
renewal of the contract. The increase was linked to an official index related to the “cost 
of living” published by the National Statistics Institute (INE). 
The statistical information available on the tenancy market in Spain was very 
scarce, although following the census (1970 and 1981), the proportion of principal 
residences in the rental market diminished from 30.1% to 20.8%. As a consequence of 
                                                 
4 Royal Decree of 21 June 1920. Its effects were extended by subsequent Royal Decrees in 1921, 1922, 
1923, 1924 and 1925. 
5 Decree of 29 December 1931. 
6 Law of 31 December 1946. 
7 Decree 4104/1964 of 24 December 1964. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
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this weak proportion, the Government decided in 1985 to liberalize the tenancy market 
by removing the requirement of compulsory extension for all tenancy contracts 
concluded after that year (“Decreto Boyer”).
8 However, the rents were still linked to the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Decree was not applicable to all of the contracts 
signed before 9 May 1985.  
The censuses suggest that the effects of the new rules were quite limited: the 
census of 1991 showed a further reduction in the weight of the tenancy market (15.2%) 
although the pace of reduction had also slowed compared to previous decades.
9 
In 1994, the Parliament enacted the most recent Law.
10 On the one hand, it aimed 
to reduce the instability caused by the very short duration of the contracts regulated by 
the “Decreto Boyer”. On the other, it aimed to address the problem of the coexistence of 
very different types of contracts (the “new” contracts concluded after 1985 and the 
“old” contracts which were rigidly regulated). Thus, the Law reintroduced compulsory 
durations  for a limited period of 5 years and maintained a rent control that tied rental 
increments to the CPI.  However, it removed the principle of the unlimited extension of 
contracts signed before the reform of 1985 (such contracts could therefore no longer be 
transferred to other members of the family, leading to their extinction in the medium 
term). 
Thus, following the classification made by Arnott,  rent control in Spain partially 
transformed into a “second generation” type during the 1960’s. However, 
modernization of the regime of compulsory extension of  tenancy contracts did not 
occur until 1985. 
The most recent legal developments in Spain do not include the approval of a 
new tenancy law (so the Law of 1994 is still into force). However, the reform of that 
Law in November 2009
11 is worth noting: it introduced a significant change by giving 
the owner more legal grounds to terminate a tenancy contract. Specifically, a landlord 
may now terminate the tenancy contract if they require the dwelling for the use of his 
child(ren),  parent(s) or a spouse in the case of divorce, provided that these 
circumstances are noted on the contract. Before 2009, the owner could only terminate 
the contract in the event that he needed to occupy the house for his own use. 
In light of the statistical information available, a stable proportion of rental 
housing has been maintained over the last decade. The weight of the rental market was 
11.4% in 2001 and remained at around that proportion until 2008 when, as estimated by 
the Ministry of Housing, it rose to 13.2%. Unfortunately there is still no information 
available allowing an assessment of the effects of the reform of 2009 in this regard.  
                                                 
8 Royal Decree 2/1985 of 30 April 1985. 
9 As the Preamble to the Law 29/1994 states: “El Real Decreto-Ley 2/1985 ha tenido resultados 
mixtos (…) Ha permitido que la tendencia a la disminución en el porcentaje de viviendas alquiladas 
que se estaba produciendo a principios de la década de los ochenta se detuviera, aunque no ha podido 
revertir sustancialmente el signo de la tendencia (…)”. 
10 Law 29/1994 of 24 November 1994. 
11 Law 19/2009 of 3 November 2009.  
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2.2  Italy 
Similarly to Spain, the rules established in Italian Civil Code were liberal. For 
instance, Article 1322 of the Civil Code (1942) established that the content of the 
contracts was a matter for the parties (although it must respect the Law). However, 
several special regulations introduced since the 1920’s were already limiting the rents 
and setting out certain requirements for the terms of the contracts (Breccia and Bargelli, 
2005). 
The first complete Law on tenancy contracts (1978)
12 introduced a quite severe 
rent control system, as the rent was determined by a set of criteria such as the 
population of the municipality, the age of the building, floor number, cadastral type, 
state of repair or preservation. The Law also established a compulsory (extendable) 
duration of 4 years. Moreover, other compulsory durations of 6 to 9 years were 
applicable depending on the activity to be carried out in the dwelling. 
In 1992,
13 a new Law deregulated rents in respect of contracts to come into 
existence and introduced some rules to deregulate existing contracts. No changes were 
made  in respect of the compulsory duration of contracts. The Law of 1992 can be 
considered as the introduction of  second generation rent control in Italy. 
These steps towards liberalization were confirmed in 1998 with the enactment of 
the most recent tenancy Law,
14 which established that the parties could freely negotiate 
the rent as well as any increase of the rent in future . It should be noted, however, that 
some special limitations on the increase in the rent subsisted (a maximum of 75% of a 
“cost of living” indicator). On the other hand, the Law maintained in force rules related 
to the duration of the contract by establishing a protected term of four years. 
The reform of the Italian regulations to achieve a more liberal framework for 
tenancy contracts were influenced by the idea that the market was not functioning 
properly. 36% of the dwelling stock was rented in 1980 but just 22.5% in 1991 (see 
Figure 1). Recent data from 2004 (18,6%) shows that the decreasing pattern continued, 
although at a much slower pace.  
2.3 Finland 
As in the previous cases, the legal philosophy underpinning the tenancy contracts 
was a liberal one (Ralli, 2005). However, after the First World War, Finland experienced 
periods of both regulation and deregulation. Rent control was introduced for the first 
time during the First World War, but was lifted by the first Law on Tenancies of 1925.
15 
Following the same pattern, the second period of rent control took place during the 
Second World War but, in this case, the restrictions were maintained after the end of the 
conflict (up until 1960 in several cities). 
                                                 
12 Law 392/1978 ("sull'equo canone”) of 27 July. 
13 Decree-Law of 11 July 1992 (converted into Law 359/1992 of 8 August 1992). 
14 Law 431/1998 of 9 December 1998. 
15 Law 166/1925 of 12 May 1925. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
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A deeper rent regulation froze the rents of the tenancy contracts in 1968 (thus,  an 
example of first generation rent control) and, in 1969, tenants were also given protection 
against eviction on an unlimited basis. These restrictions were also set forth in the 
Constitution in 1970. The regulations affecting the tenancy market in Finland were only 
relaxed in the following decade (the rent freeze was substituted by a complex system of 
rent regulation in the Law 634/1987).  
Heavy regulation was accompanied by a contraction of the tenancy market from 
32.5% (1970) to 24.7% (1990) (see Figure 1). 
During the 1990’s the market was gradually liberalized in three phases: from 1991, 
some buildings in specific zones of Finland were freed from rent control. The measure 
was then extended to all  future contracts in 1992. Finally, the new tenancy Law of 
1995
16 deregulated all contracts (with the exception of the ARAVA program applicable 
to state-subsidized rental dwellings). On the other hand, the new Law did not include 
any restrictions with respect to the duration of the contract so any short-term agreement 
was possible. As a consequence, one can conclude that Finland is the only country of 
the European Union to have totally liberalized a previously regulated tenancy market. 
The share of the housing market that was rented increased to 31% in 2004. 
Lyytikäinen (2006) identifies the abolition of the rent control with a corresponding 
increase in the rent paid (the average rent per square meter increased by 57% between 
1990 and 2004). 
2.4 United Kingdom 
England and Wales do not have a specific body of “housing law”. Thus, the 
norms applicable to tenancy contracts stem from more general branches of law such as 
property law and contract law (Cowan and Laurie, 2005). However, some restrictions 
applicable to the tenancy market were introduced through the adoption of some special 
regulations (statutes). 
The first example of rent control and protection against eviction occurred during 
the First World War with the “Increase in Rent and Mortgage Interest Act” of 1915.
17 
Several subsequent Acts
18 preserved or even extended the rent control measures 
(Diamond, 1960). As a matter of fact, rent control did not disappear until 1965 when it 
was replaced by rent regulation (representing a “second generation” control). 
According to Paish (1972), these long-lasting restrictions had a negative effect on 
the maintenance of the dwellings and reduced the mobility of tenants who occupied a 
rent-controlled dwelling (as they found it unprofitable to move). Moreover, these 
restrictions reduced the number of units being let, as a significant amount of the 
previously rented dwellings were gradually channeled towards the property market. 
Similar effects of tenancy regulations have been found in the case of many other 
countries or cities (Olsen, 1972, Early, 1999, Sims, 2007).  
                                                 
16 Law 481/1995 of 31 March 1995. 
17 Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act, 1915. 
18 Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920. Rent and Mortgage Restrictions 
Act, 1923. Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act, 1946. Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act 1949.  
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Later on, the Rent Act of 1977 established a “protected tenancy” which included 
a second generation rent control, although any increase in the rent was regulated by 
complex provisions and the legislation also maintained a permanent protection against 
eviction for the tenant. 
The first steps towards liberalization of the market took place with the Housing 
Act of 1988, which abolished the rent regulation. In respect of compulsory duration 
clauses, the Act introduced a new type of regulated contract, the “assured shorthold 
tenancy” with a period of protection against eviction of only 6 months. However, it also 
included an “assured tenancy” contract, containing similar conditions to the old 
“protected tenancy”. Finally, a new Housing Act of 1996 introduced further changes in 
favor of the generalization of the “assured shorthold tenancy”. 
Consequently, England and Wales have undergone an evolution from a liberal 
concept of tenancy contracts to a strict system of contract restrictions, finally returning 
again to a quite liberal concept of tenancy contract in which the main restriction is the 
“compulsory” duration of 6 months, which is quite short by European standards (see 
Table 1). 
The figures of the tenancy market in England and Wales also show quite 
important changes. In 1900, just 10% of households were owner-occupied, while in 
2000 that proportion reached 70% (Cowan and Laurie, 2005). In 2004, the share of 
rented dwellings in the UK was 31% (see Figure 1). We can observe a slow reduction in 
the proportion of rented dwellings over recent decades although this proportion 
remained stable in later years. 
2.5 Recent reforms 
These cases suggest the existence of a general pattern in the evolution of tenancy 
market regulation in Europe throughout the 20
th century: initially all countries moved 
from a liberal concept of tenancy relations towards a more protective and regulated 
approach. That change was influenced by the experience of the two World Wars. The 
introduction of very restrictive regulations coincides with significant reductions in the 
share of rented dwellings. Later on, all countries tended to reduce the burden imposed 
on the landlord and tried to limit the scope of the protection afforded to the tenant's 
although no country (with the exception of Finland) completely liberalized the tenancy 
market. Deregulation was accompanied by an increase in rented dwellings in Finland 
and  stabilization in the other countries examined. Those effects can be taken as partial 
evidence, admittedly very weak, that the restrictive European regulations may have 
brought out some negative effects in the European markets. As previously stated, there 
are several other important factors affecting the tenancy market that are not taken into 
account in this partial-equilibrium argument (i.e. improved access to credit, taxation, 
changing mobility patterns, etc). 
Table 1 shows two key features of the current European regulations in 12 EU 
Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England/Wales, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden): the minimum duration of the Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
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tenancy contract (if such regulation exists, see column DURATION) and the rules 
governing any increase in the rent paid by the tenant (see column RENT). 
Across Europe, direct regulation of the amount of rent that a landlord may charge 
at the moment of entering into a contract has completely disappeared. On the other 
hand, the negotiation of any increase in the rent paid by the sitting tenant after the first 
year of contract is not free, but regulated in several countries in accordance with a 
“second generation” type of control (for instance, linking any increase in the rent to an 
index identified by the legislation). In Austria, Portugal and Spain, it is index-linked to 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Similarly, in Belgium, the maximum increase is in 
accordance with the “cost of living” index. In France, the maximum increase is given by 
the “construction cost index” (set by the Government).  
In relation to the second issue, the legislation usually protects a tenant against 
eviction for a certain period (see column “DURATION”) by setting a “compulsory 
duration”. For instance, the duration of a tenancy contract in Spain is 5 years (4 years in 
Italy and 3 years in France). Thus, the tenant may decide not to move for five years or 
to move after the first one, but the landlord cannot reduce the “potential” duration of 
the contract. It is after those five protected years that a real re-negotiation between the 
landlord and the tenant could take place. It is rare to find this type of limited restriction 
in other jurisdictions, like the ones in force in several cities of the United States.     
3.  A model for European tenancy markets 
The objective of this section is to explore theoretically the effects of the 
European-type of tenancy market regulations on the quantity of houses being let in the 
market. For this purpose, the model proposed by Basu and Emerson (2000) is modified 
and adapted to the “European” institutional framework. Understanding the impact of 
restrictive regulations (such the ones explained above) may help to understand one of 
the possible determinants of the reduction of the share of tenancy in Europe. 
3.1  The Basu and Emerson model for tenancy markets and the European 
institutions 
In their original model, Basu and Emerson (2000) study a very restrictive “first 
generation” type of rent control. In their setup, once the contract is entered into (and a 
rent agreed), the landlord cannot update the rent until the end of the contract and, as 
the legislation protects the tenant against eviction indefinitely, the tenant decides how 
long he wishes to remain in the dwelling. In this context, due to the eroding effect of 
inflation, it is of extreme relevance for the landlord to know the kind of tenants he takes 
(type understood as “long-stayer” or “short-stayer” tenant because, with inflation, the 
rent in real terms will diminish periodically). Thus, inflation acts as a tax on a landlord's 
income with redistributive consequences, adverse to owners and favorable to tenants. 
These stylized institutions differ quite considerably to what is currently regulated by law 
in Europe (see Table 1). 
European policymakers are aware of the existence of inflation as an “ever” 
increasing “cost of living” in the economy, as was emphasized in section 2. Legislation 
in various European countries therefore allows the landlord to increase the contracted 
rent, at the end of each contractual period, in accordance with a rate linked to some  
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indicator of past inflation (such as the CPI, thus following a “second generation” 
control). Note, however, that those measures are usually related to the price increase in 
the whole economy (and not specifically to increased rents in the tenancy market). 
Another difference with the Basu and Emerson (2000) framework is that the protection 
against eviction in favor of the tenant does not last indefinitely (being usually applicable 
for just 3 to 5 years).      
3.2 Basics of the model 
Basu and Emerson (2000) propose a partial equilibrium model for the tenancy 
market in which the market is affected by a problem of information asymmetry and 
adverse selection. There are two types of agents in the model: landlords and tenants. 
Tenants are distributed in groups or types that differ in how long they stay in the 
residence. It can be assumed that a type 1 tenant stays 1 year in the residence. A type 2 
stays 2 years and so on. A fraction i of the tenants is of type i (all types together sum up 
to a probability, p, of 1). If t represents time, the following could be written: 
 
n t t t t < < < < ... 3 2 1          ( 1 )  
 
Therefore, the duration of the contract will be defined by the tenant's type as it is 
the tenant who decides when to move. Moreover, the tenant knows his “type”, but the 
landlord does not have access to that information. The landlord is consequently unable 
to distinguish between the various tenants types. 
The model assumes that there is inflation (θ) in the economy and that it is not 
corrected by any mechanism (this rate of inflation, θ, is understood as the rise in prices 
in all goods and services of the economy, tenancy rents included). Therefore the 
landlord receives the real value 
θ + 1
1
 after one period (or the fraction 
θ + 1
1
 of the rent 
if the rent is different from 1). Moreover, landlords do not value equally a rent received 
today compared to a rent to be received in the future. Therefore a discount factor δ∈  
(0, 1) has been introduced in the model. 
vi is the value of the rents that a landlord receives from his tenants if only type i 
tenants are present. Summing up for an infinite succession of type i tenants and taking 




































1      (2) 
 
Then, the following holds: 
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If i < j then vi > vj           ( 3 )  
 
On the other hand, v(i) is the value of the rents that a landlord receives when only 







































































   (4) 
 
Where pk is the probability of getting a type k tenant into the apartment. Then, the 
following holds, 
 
If  i < j  then v(i)>v(j)            ( 5 )  
 
It may be observed that, from the point of view of a landlord, the higher the value 
of v the better. Therefore he would prefer to have short stayers rather than long stayers. 
Basu and Emerson (2000) introduced adverse selection through limiting the types 
of tenants that will be finally renting a residence. If the rent is very high some types of 
tenants will find it unaffordable to rent and therefore will opt for other options, such as 
remaining in the family home. This outside option is assumed to be the same for the 
different types of tenants and it is assumed to have a similar value in any case. 
Therefore, the different outputs of the model are generated by heterogeneity on the 
tenants’ side (long versus short stayers). 
The adverse selection mechanism is based on the supposition that the short 
stayers are the first to decide not to rent when the rent is high. Supposing that renting a 
residence gives the tenant a utility of T and remaining in the parents’ home (or 
equivalent options) a utility NT, the difference (D) between both utilities must be 
positive for an individual to decide to rent an apartment. 
 
T  –  N T  =  D  >  0                  ( 6 )  
 
For a tenant it is relevant the rent expressed in present value terms (vi), thus 
already “eroded” by the inflation. Therefore a tenant will rent if: 
 
T – NT = D ≥ Rvi           ( 7 )  
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Note that vi depends on i, so if j > i then vi > vj. It is worth noting that equation 7 
is assuming that a specific tenant is defined for eternity as a type i. 
On the other hand, Basu and Emerson (2000) call V(R) the landlord's expected 
present value of the rents he receives when the rent (in nominal terms) is R. See Figure 
2. 
 
V(R) reaches its maximum when R = D/vn         (8) 
 
D/vn is a critical level of the rent at which the higher type of tenant (so far the 
type n or the type 4 in Figure 2) decides not to rent. C (see Figure 2) represents the cost 
for the landlord of leasing out a residence, for instance, preparing the apartment to be 
rented paying some administrative fees. Note that the costs may be proportionally 
higher the shorter the periods the tenants stay in the apartment, although that 
circumstance is not included in this setup. 
 














Source: Self elaboration. 
 
We have the following critical values of V(R) as a result, 
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The results obtained in this basic setup are the following: on the one hand, if there 
is a monopolistic landlord, he will charge a rent R=D/vn . Note that in Figure 2 the 
curves v(i) define the height of the V(R) curve at the breaking points. Thus, only the 
higher type (n) will stay in the market, that is, a four year type in Figure 2 (all the rest of 
the tenant types will find unaffordable to rent and will opt for other options). On the 
other hand, when there are competitive landlords, the rent R* will be defined by 
C=V(R). One can observe that the height of the peaks plays an important role in this 
case. Consequently, the rent paid in the market will approach the cost of preparing the 
residence to be rented. The rent R obtained in that case will define which types (if any) 
of tenants will decide not to rent. The lower the C the lower the equilibrium rent and 
therefore the less types of tenants that will be “excluded” from the market. 
3.3 The basic model with inflation (CPI) adjusted rents 
With inflation escalation (correcting for θ in the model) and with R=1 euro the 




) ( δ −
= = i i v v            ( 9 )  
 
Equation 9 does not depend on any sub-index, therefore the tenant is irrelevant 
for the landlord when rent escalation following the inflation is allowed. Thus, it is not 
possible to differentiate between those that find it worthwhile to rent and those who 
prefer to stay out of the tenancy market. 





− ) 1 ( δ
         ( 1 0 )  
 
Therefore the type of the tenant is not important in the decision to rent. 
Two criticisms may be done to the considerations made above. On the one hand 
it should be said that concluding that the introduction of rent escalation removes the 
mechanism of adverse selection is not true in all the cases. Only if the CPI coincides 
with the observed increase in the rents contracted in the market (the sub-index of rented  
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property of the CPI), the correction by θ would eliminate the adverse selection 
mechanism. The next section is devoted to discuss that topic. On the other hand, even 
after the correction by θ the tenant has still a contractual advantage with respect to the 
landlord. The law is always granting to the tenant an option of changing landlords if he 
wants to do so (but the landlord cannot evict freely its tenants).  
3.4 European rent escalation and adverse selection 
Overcoming the adverse selection problem is only possible if the allowed rent 
escalation follows the increase in the rents observed in the tenancy market (the sub-
index of rented property in the CPI or a similar index representing just the tenancy 
market) and not a general price index (as is frequently the case in Europe). Generally 
both indices do not coincide. Figure 3 graphs the difference between the HICP inflation 
(harmonized inflation) in housing (rents plus gas, water and electricity as provided by 
the Eurostat indicators) and the general or overall inflation. As it can be seen, that 
difference is usually above 0. The figure indicates that renting is usually more 
inflationary than the overall HICP. 
 













Source: Eurostat (2008). 
 
The incentive for a landlord to prefer short stayers versus long stayers is related to 
the fact that the rent he gets is eroded (once a contract is concluded), compared to that 
demanded in future contracts on the market. If the landlord has short stayers he will be 
able to reset the rent he demands as soon as he has a new tenant and therefore he would 
be able to charge the rent at the market level, fully up-to-date with inflation and 
increases in rent on the market since the conclusion of the previous contract. If the 
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any observed rent increase in the tenancy market, the incentive for the landlord to have 
short stay tenants disappears. 
These statements can be explored in the model. For convenience, the rate at 
which the rents increase in the market can be stated as γ. And, as before, let’s call θ the 
rate at which the regulation allows the landlord to periodically update the rent. θ may be 
understood as the CPI index (or a “cost of living” index) in the European regulations. 
It can be demonstrated that in a market where the applicable laws allow escalation 
of the rent following θ and θ < γ, then there is a problem of adverse selection in the 
tenancy market. 
Taking into account a discount factor δ a s be fo re  ( a n d  if R=1), we can now 







































































=         ( 1 2 )  
 
Then, the following holds (a proof is provided in the appendix 1) 
 
If  i < j  then vi > vj           ( 1 3 )  
 
As before, v(i) represents the stream of income a landlord receives when type i 
tenants or above make themselves available to the landlord. 

















































































δ    
(14) 
 
That can be rewritten as follows,  


































) (               ( 1 5 )  
 
Then the following also holds (a proof is provided in the appendix 2): 
 
If  i < j  then v(i) > v(j)           ( 1 6 )  
 
As may be concluded from the equations set out so far, the landlord prefers short 
stayers than long stayers as the income he receives will be higher in the case of the 
former. Also the agents are not indifferent with respect to time. A long stayer pays less 




T - NT = D > Rvi            ( 1 7 )  
 
As previously stated, if i < j then vi > vj. Thus, short stayers will be the first types 
of tenants to decide not to rent because they “suffer” a higher value v. The landlord's 
expected present value of the rent will reach its maximum level when R = D/vn. That is, 
D = Rvn. 
Thus, if the rent escalation allowed is below the rate of the rent increase in the 
tenancy market (described as the “rent index”), the adverse selection problem continues 
to affect the market outcomes. 
Therefore, even though the various national legislations in Europe allow for rent 
escalation following the general inflation or a similar index, they does not avoid the 
adverse selection problem to affect the market outcomes when the rent signed in the 
new contracts grows faster than the prices in the rest of the goods of the economy.  
3.4.1 Between extreme cases 
The inefficiency in the market will be higher if the difference between the CPI (or 
another general inflation index) and the specific rent index grows. This statement can be 
expressed in the following way (for a given rate of rent increase of γ). 
 
If  θ < θ’  then  vi(γ,θ) < vi(γ,θ’)  and  v(i)(γ,θ) < v(i)(γ,θ’)       ( 1 8 )  
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That is, an increase in θ (if γ is constant) entails an increase in the real rent the 
tenant will pay. 
From the fundamental equations already proposed it is possible to derive the 





































δ       (19) 
 
By inspection of equation 19 it is easy to see that the higher the θ, the higher is the 
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Then the higher the θ, the higher the value of v(i). 
Graphically, when observing the shape of the V(R) curve it is important to stress 
that the curves representing v(i) and vi are steeper the higher is γ-θ (the lower the 
escalation allowed by the applicable law the flatter those lines). The height of a peak is 
defined by (D)v(i)/vi. Therefore it is necessary to analyze the value of v(i)/vi when the 
allowed escalation changes. 
Having that k > i (the tenant of type k stays longer that a tenant of type i) the 
following must hold when θ < θ’, 
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<           ( 2 1 )  
 
Lets define τ as the extra time a type k stays in the dwelling in comparison with a 
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From 21, the following must hold (for θ < θ’). 
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<          ( 2 4 )  
 
Inequality 24 indicates that the higher the rent escalation θ allowed by the 
applicable legislation Law, the higher the “peak” (at the break points). 
If there are several landlords competing to obtain the tenants, and a cost C of 
preparing a residence to be rented, the equilibrium rent is defined graphically by the 
point of hit between C and the V(R) curve. If we observe that the escalation allowed is 
lower, the equilibrium rent must increase as, graphically, the V(R) line moves to the 
right and the peaks are now shorter. 
A higher rent excludes more types of potential tenants from the market. As θ 
grows, the peaks of the V(R) line get higher and the break points move to the left,  with 
the result of a smaller R (so less types are excluded; that is a relief for the adverse 
selection problem). 
On the other hand, in a monopolistic case, the rent will be set up at D/vn. Hence 
the equilibrium rent will change slightly depending on the value of vn (as vn(γ,θ) < vn(γ,θ’)). So 
when the escalation allowed is higher, the equilibrium rent for the case of monopoly is 
lower.   
The statements made above indicate that allowing for a higher rate of escalation 
mitigates the inefficiency of the market. 
3.4.2 If there is a reduction in the market rents 
If γ is exactly equal to the amount that the government allows for escalation (the 
“cost of living” or the CPI) no adverse selection will take place.  
What happens to the previously existing tenancy relations in a market where the 
rents agreed in future contracts are diminishing over time? In that case the rents of the 
market (the rents agreed in the  contracts coming into existence signed one period after Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
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another) would be falling. Thus, the new tenants (tenants that have just arrived on the 
market) would be paying less than the previously existing tenants renting similar flats. 
As a consequence, the only way for the landlord to keep his existing tenant is to reduce 
the rent he asks at a rate (falling) near to that of the market. 
Therefore, it is worth noting that even in this case the positions of tenants and 
landlords are unequal. That is, in this case the applicable law leaves the tenant the option 
to move and thus change landlords if the rents rise below the general inflation. 
However, in this case there is no issue of adverse selection and therefore the 
legislation as usually adopted in Europe does not entail the inefficiencies observed 
where there is a persistent reduction of market rents.   
3.5 Analysis of contracts with a limited duration of protection for the 
tenant 
As discussed above, the applicable national laws in Europe do not generally 
protect a sitting tenant indefinitely. In fact, such laws usually protect a tenant against 
eviction for a limited period (usually 3 to 5 years). After that period has expired, the 
tenant and the landlord will have to renegotiate the contract. Thus, the continuation of 
the tenancy relationship is not guaranteed. Therefore the contract between the parties is 
virtually new again after the relationship has reached the limit of the period of 
protection. 
The aim of this section is to introduce this limited protection afforded by law to 
the tenant into the model. A relevant issue for the landlord in the model is that he 
cannot distinguish between tenants' types. In the case of a law that protects the tenants 
for m periods, the landlord knows that the “higher” type of tenant that exists in the 
economy is a type tm. That is to say that a landlord is not willing to keep a tenant more 
than m periods as for any n > m, vm > vn and v(m) > v(n). Therefore, in this context of 
asymmetric information, if the applicable law protects the tenant for m periods, the 
higher types disappear (after m periods the landlord will evict the tenant if he does not 
pay the actual market rent). 
If, before introducing the restriction the higher type of tenant in the economy was 
a type k and afterwards a new law (including a protection term of m periods) is adopted 
and if k < m, that “limited duration of protection” is neutral and does not produce any 
effect in the economy. Thus, in the next paragraphs we assume that the higher type of 
tenant (k) existing in the market is willing to stay longer in the residence than the period 
for which he is protected (m periods established by the applicable law).That is, we study 
the case in which the law act as a constraint. 
Introducing the term in the model. The analysis should cover how the 
expressions for vi and v(i) change if the limited duration of tenancy protection is present 
and thus if there is a new equilibrium in the market. 
vi does not change if we change the different types of tenants that exist in the 
economy. Although note that a value v exists only for the types i ≤ m. On the other 
hand, v(i) changes. Now, the tenants that may “show up” correspond to a less number of 
types. Let’s call v(i,m) to the value for the expression v(i) when just types i to m can show 
up. Then the following condition holds:  
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v(i,m+1) < v(i,m)          ( 2 5 )  
 





















































+      (26) 
 

































































































+     
(27) 
 































































    (28) 
 
When the law protects the tenant against eviction for a greater period of time, the 
value of v(i) diminishes (that is v(i,m+1) < v(i,m)). If a law reduces the number of periods of 
protection against eviction from m+1 to m we should expect an increase of the value of 
v(i). In Figure 4 a situation where the Law reduces the maximum term of protection from 
m=4 to m=3 has been represented. Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
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Source: Self elaboration. 
 
Case of having a monopolistic landlord. Reducing the number of periods of 
protection yields a reduction in the rent charged by the monopolist, therefore less 
(lower) types of tenants are excluded from the market. 
As previously discussed, the monopoly charges a rent equal to R=D/vt. Where t 
represents the higher type existing in the economy. If the number of periods of 
protection against eviction is reduced, t will be lower. With a lower t the value vt is 
higher. With a higher vt the rent R charged by the monopolist will be lower if the outside 
option does not change. 
Case of having competitive landlords. When the number of periods of 
protection is reduced, the equilibrium rent also decreases. That could exclude, therefore, 
less (lower) types of tenants from the market. That is, the landlords will charge a rent 
determined by the cost C of allowing the dwelling to be rented on the market. 
Graphically, as the curves defined by vi continue to be in the same place but the curves 
defined by v(i) are now steeper, there is now a new V(R) line. This V(R) line maintains 
the places where the “breaks” (peaks) (D/v1, D/v2...) can be found, but the height of the 
peaks are now higher. The coincidence between the V(R) line and the C line will yield 
an equilibrium rent that is lower than before. 
3.6 Summarizing the results of the model 
The aim of the model was to analyze the effects on the market of the introduction 
of two highly spread (and typically European) institutions: a maximum allowed increase 
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in the rent demanded by the landlord (rent control) and protection against eviction for 
the tenant for a limited number of periods (protection against eviction). 
If the rent escalation allowed is below the rate of rent increase in the tenancy 
market, an adverse selection problem affects the market outcomes. The adverse 
selection problem is aggravated as the difference between the allowed escalation and the 
market rent increase grows. That will increase the equilibrium rent and, through the 
mechanism of the model, it will exclude some tenants from the market. On the other 
hand, it was concluded that the longer the period for which the law protects the tenant 
against eviction, the higher the rent paid in equilibrium (therefore more tenant types are 
excluded from the market). Note that the effects of both restrictions go in the same 
direction. 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper provides an economic analysis of the regulations affecting European 
tenancy contracts. Although rent control has drawn the attention of the greater part of 
the literature on tenancy markets, an analysis of the regulations in place in Europe 
points to the existence of another main intervention in the market called “protection 
against eviction” or “compulsory duration” that has been usually neglected. Both types 
of European regulations (rent control and periods of protection against eviction) are 
explored theoretically in an information asymmetry model of tenancy markets proposed 
by Basu and Emerson (2000). The model, which was originally designed for analyzing 
contracts with no inflation clause and of potentially infinite duration, is adapted to 
include rent escalation and a limited protection against eviction. The results of the 
model show that those interventions (rent control and compulsory duration) entail some 
negative effects as they may drive some participants out of the tenancy market. 
Therefore the model provides a partial-equilibrium explanation, based on the 
tenancy laws of various European countries, for the diminishing weight of the tenancy 
markets in Europe throughout the 20
th century. As was emphasized in section 2, most 
European countries experienced the same evolution from a noninterventionist approach 
to tenancy relations towards a more regulated approach. Furthermore, the introduction 
of several legal restrictions on the tenancy market in several European countries 
coincided with a reduction in the proportion of rented dwellings in the housing market.  
For instance, the reduction in the tenancy market share in Spain from 30.1% in 
1970 to 20.8% in 1981 occurred while a very restrictive form of rent control and 
protection against eviction was in force. While that share continued to diminish in 
subsequent decades, the reductions were not as pronounced and the market tended to 
stabilize (also coinciding with less restrictive forms of regulation). Same reasoning can 
be employed for the case of Italy where the tenancy market suffered a severe reduction 
from 36% (as a share of the total stock of principal residences) in 1980 to just 22.5% in 
1991 in tandem with quite severe restrictions of the tenancy contracts. However, in 
coincidence with the approval of milder regulations, data from 2004 (18.6%) show that 
the decreasing pattern continued, although at a slower pace. Same reasoning can be also 
utilized in the case of the UK. It must be recognized however that it is more difficult for 
a small share of the rental market to be further reduced. Finally, it is also interesting to 
highlight again the case of Finland, where the abrogation of the rent control rules and Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
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the compulsory contractual periods (being the only case of such abrogation among the 
European countries analyzed) coincided with an increase in the weight of the tenancy 
market (24.7% in 1990 compared to 31% in 2004). 
The limitations of this analysis which, for instance, does not take into account 
other important policy measures (such as taxation) should be borne in mind. 
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Appendix  1:  Proof for expression 13 
The demonstration of Lemma 1 of Basu and Emerson (2000) has been followed 
to provide a proof for 13. 
The aim was to demonstrate that: 
 
If i < j then vi > vj 
 
Lets assume that tj = ti+1 and that vj
k is the present value of rents earned by a 
landlord whose first k tenants are of type i and all others of type j. 
It is possible to see that vj
1 > vj. For a rent R=1, vj
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That implies that vj
1 > vj. And as Basu and Emerson (2000) highlight, if vj
k > vj
k-1, as  
lim k→∞ vj
k = vi, it must be true that vi > vj ■  
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Appendix 2: Proof for expression 16 
The aim was to demonstrate that: 
 
If  i < j  then v(i) > v(j) 
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) (      (35) 
 
With 34 and 35 the following expression is obtained: 
 Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti, The Regulation of Residential Tenancy Markets in Post-War Western Europe: 
 An Economic Analysis 
 
 

































































) (         ( 3 6 )  
 






























) (          ( 3 7 )  
 
v(i) is a weighted average of vi, vi+1, ..., vn. If j > i then v(i) is obtained from v(j) 
distributing the weight that j had among the rest of the values of v (i.e. for i, i+1, ..., j-1). 
As a conclusion it is found that if k < j and vk > vj (done in the last section), then 
it must follow that v(i )> v(j) (when j < i) ■ 
 